Newly Disclosed Intelligence Highlights Tehran’s Nuclear Ambitions

On Friday, January 31, 2025, the National Council of Resistance of Iran-U.S. Representative Office (NCRI-US) released significant intelligence exposing the Iranian regime’s ongoing efforts to develop nuclear warheads. The intelligence, derived from the Defense and Strategic Research Committee of NCRI and based on reports from the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) network inside Iran, details the covert expansion of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Iran’s Nuclear Warhead Development at Shahrud Site

The intelligence reveals that the Iranian regime is actively working on nuclear warheads designed for solid-fuel missiles with a range exceeding 3,000 kilometers at the Shahrud missile site. This effort is being spearheaded by the Organization for Advanced Defense Research (SPND), which was established to centralize Iran’s nuclear weapons activities.

Shahrud Site Operations and Security Measures

• A highly militarized zone, operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force with extreme security measures.
• Civilian access is strictly prohibited; unauthorized entry leads to immediate arrest.
• Personnel are not allowed to use personal vehicles within the site; all transportation is managed by IRGC Aerospace Force vehicles.

Key Activities at Shahrud

• Houses a missile testing site and launchpad.
• Operates under the guise of a satellite program to evade scrutiny.
• The Ghaem-100 missile is being developed as the primary nuclear warhead carrier, replacing the older Shahab-3 missile.
• Developing independent satellite communication for tracking nuclear warheads.
• The Ghaem-100 is a solid-fuel, mobile missile modeled after a North Korean design.

Key Figures Involved in the Project

• Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam – IRGC Brigadier General who approved the Ghaem missile and supervised the Shahrud site’s development before his death in a 2011 test explosion.
• Brigadier General Ali Jafarabadi – Current head of the Ghaem-100 project, working with experts from Imam Hossein University.
• Salman Farsi Space Command – Established by the IRGC Aerospace Force in 2011, overseeing nuclear-related activities at Shahrud.

Expansion of SPND Facilities at Semnan

Further intelligence has unveiled the expansion of nuclear weapons activities at the Semnan facility, another key site under SPND’s jurisdiction:

Operations at Semnan

• Conducts tests on the Simorgh missile, which is publicly presented as a satellite launch vehicle.
• Largely underground facility, heavily expanded under the pretext of space research.
• The Khomeini Space Launch Terminal was created as a front for these activities.
• Expanded from two facilities in 2005 to eight interconnected by underground tunnels.
• The Simorgh missile is also based on North Korean designs.

Nuclear Warhead Research at Semnan

• SPND’s Geophysics Group is conducting high-explosive detonation tests crucial for nuclear warhead development.
• Engaged in underground tests in the Semnan desert areas.
• Key specialists involved include Mohammad Javad Zaker, Hamed Aber, and Farhad Moradiani Khosrowabad.
• Activities are disguised through partnerships with Iran’s International Institute of Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, as well as university geophysics departments.

Sorkhe Hesar Site Near Tehran

• SPND has significantly expanded its operations at Sorkhe Hesar since its exposure in 2020.
• This facility plays a vital role in advancing Iran’s clandestine nuclear efforts.

Iran’s Tactics to Conceal Nuclear Weapons Development

• SPND established the Directorate for Nuclear Treaties to mislead international watchdogs.
• Operates under Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
• Claims compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) while covertly developing nuclear warheads.
• SPND’s Geophysics Group collaborates closely with the Directorate for Nuclear Treaties.

Iran’s Strategy: Stalling for Time to Advance Its Nuclear Program

A confidential memo obtained by NCRI-US outlines Tehran’s deliberate strategy to delay negotiations with European nations and engage in indirect talks with the U.S. to maintain the status quo. The regime’s primary objective is to prolong discussions for six months, allowing it to surpass the sunset clause in UN Security Resolution 2231, which would otherwise keep restrictions in place.

Evidence of Iran’s Deception

• Soona Samsami, NCRI-US Representative, emphasized that Iran has historically used negotiations as a tool to buy time for its nuclear program.
• She cited Hassan Rouhani’s 2006 admission that Iran misled European negotiators while secretly advancing its nuclear capabilities.
• Ali Akbar Salehi, former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, admitted in 2019 that Iran deliberately misled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its nuclear infrastructure.

Recommendations for the International Community

To counter the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions, NCRI-US urges the following actions:

1. Invoke the snapback mechanism to reinstate all six UN Security Council resolutions against Iran.
2. Shut down all nuclear-related sites, including uranium enrichment facilities, and grant the IAEA unrestricted access to Iran’s nuclear program.
3. Enforce severe consequences for violations; previous diplomatic engagements without strict enforcement have only emboldened Iran’s deceptive tactics.

Call for Immediate Action

At the conclusion of the briefing, NCRI-US Deputy Director Alireza Jafarzadeh addressed questions from the media, reiterating the urgent necessity for international intervention to prevent Iran’s clerical regime from attaining nuclear weapons capability. He stressed that continued inaction would only facilitate Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, increasing the risk of regional and global instability.

NCRI-US’s latest revelations reinforce the urgency of proactive measures to counter Iran’s nuclear weapons program before it reaches full operational capacity.