Iran’s Guardian Council eliminated most of the candidates of the regime’s sham presidential election at the behest of the mullahs’ supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei eliminated the so-called reformist faction and even prevented Ali Larijani, the regime’s speaker of the parliament for three consecutive terms. Khamenei’s massive purge was unexpected and shocking even for the highest levels of the regime. Thus, Khamenei has shot himself in the leg.

What is the cost of unifying power?

Khamenei was not unaware of the high cost of his action. Still, to control and oppress Iran’s explosive society, mainly after the 2019 major Iran protests, Khamenei has decided to unipolar his regime and pull Ebrahim Raisi, the current judiciary chief, out of the ballot box.

But will Khamenei succeed in achieving his goal? Numerous events these days foretell Khamenei’s failure in his quest.

In the past, Khamenei has repeatedly tried to unify his regime, but each time he has seen negative results. One example is the case of the regime’s former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an unknown member of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) who later disobeyed Khamenei, despite the heavy price the supreme leader paid for his selection.

Larijani’s elimination from the sham presidential election has provoked protests in the Qom Seminary, since he had the support of some of the mullahs and Shi’ite clerics

“Due to the widespread disqualification of presidential candidates, everyone knows that this election will be unprofessional, non-competitive, and will have a low voter turnout,” Seminary Teachers Association in Qom said in a statement on May 26, 2021. 

In the social dimension, due to the crushing economic pressures, the situation is too acute that such maneuvers of the Supreme Leader and the appointment of Raisi has no effects.

The continuation and expansion of nationwide protests by Iranians from all walks of life is a testament to this fact.

Therefore, it is safe to say that Khamenei’s contraction policy will make the regime weaker and intensify its factional feuds.

The rival faction will soon rush to the scene to maintain the levers of power and plunder, leaving no room for Khamenei and his appointees.

Khamenei’s position in the regime as the ultimate power is lost, because he has practically emerged as the head of the dominant faction. Thus, he will be an easy target for attacks and revelations of the rival faction. Also, Khamenei has removed the barriers between himself and the angry people and has placed himself in the direct target of the anger and uproar of the rising masses.

As a part of his contraction policy, Khamenei will increasingly resort to belligerent policies and the export of terrorism in the region and will try to cover its devastating costs by intensifying plundering people.

The intensification of plundering is always the flip side of the oppression. Pulling Raisi out of the ballot box send this message to the Iranian society that oppression will increase. The execution of six prisoners Birjand Prison, the highest number of mass executions in recent months is a testament to this fact.

But to what extent and to what time can Khamenei continue his brutal and deadly looting and repression of the oppressed people? If he could have controlled the turbulent society of Iran with the old methods and the previous structure of his system, he would never have acted in this manner. Yet, as history has proven, all falling dictatorships must make a deadly mistake when reaching their final days.